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THE FLOWERING OF EQUITABLE
COMPENSATION IN AUSTRALIAN REMEDIAL
LAW: THE UNDERRATED CASE OF BIALA
PTY. LTD. v. MALLINA HOLDINGS LTD.
Gary Davis*
While much the of the common law world has moved to merge legal
doctrines previously divided between courts of law and equity,
Australia has resisted this trend, continuing to limit the application of
certain doctrines to their historical roots. Through an examination of
the underrated case of Biala Pty. Ltd. v. Mallina Holdings Ltd., this
Article discusses the context and repercussions of maintaining the
divide between law and equity in Australian law. Biala demonstrated
the potency of the remedy of equitable compensation but also
demonstrated that Australia continues to be a jurisdiction where
conventional doctrinal categories remain predominant.
INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Remedies Law Discussion Forum was held at Emory
University Law School in May 2007. As with its predecessors in the
series, it brought together a select group of remedies law scholars
from around the common law world to discuss remedial law issues
and developments. An enduring value of these forums, enhanced by
subsequent publication, is their comparative aspect, the capacity to
learn from the traditions, and approaches adopted in other
jurisdictions. This Article was produced for this forum in the same
spirit.
As the practice has developed, two forum themes were offered
as focal points for preparation and discussion. One such theme, "the
most underrated remedies decision," provides the foundation for this
Article. No formal definition of "underrated" having been furnished,
the term is taken in this Article to denote a case that has had
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Adelaide, Australia; Dean, Faculty of Law, Business and Arts, Charles Darwin University,
Darwin, Australia.
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significant influence on an aspect of remedial law but without due
acknowledgment or recognition being subsequently accorded to it.
This Article is accordingly inspired by a case from the Supreme
Court of Western Australia, Biala Pty. Ltd. v. Mallina Holdings Ltd.'
Although the judgment was affirmed on appeal to the Full Court of
the Supreme Court of Western Australia,2 it is that lower court
judgment, delivered by Justice Ipp, that attracts our focus. The
decision itself produced no particular startling law per se. The facts,
however, were quite startling, and the result even more so. The case
was embedded within an extensive milieu of government-business
interplay and overreach, popularized by the label "W.A. Inc." and
eventually sparking a Royal Commission3 that ultimately saw a
number of the major players in Australian business and politics
crash, burn, and end up in jail.' As such, it holds some fascination
for students of law and governance alike.
The case marks a departure point for the potency of the remedy
of equitable compensation in Australian law, and it is in that respect
that our interest lies for present purposes. More broadly, subsequent
developments in this aspect of Australian remedial law signify the
dominance within Australian legal culture of an approach to
remedies law that is rooted in history. In this respect, Australian law
differs from the approaches taken elsewhere in the common law
world.
I. THE FACTS OF THE CASE
Operating via his holding company, an entrepreneur and
property developer named Dallas Dempster entered into an equal
interest joint venture with the mineral exploration company Mallina
Holdings ("Mallina").5 The purpose of the joint venture was to seek
from the Western Australian Government a so-called exclusive
mandate to conduct a feasibility study into the development of a
petrochemical plant in the State. The exclusive mandate concept
1. Biala Pty. Ltd. v. Mallina Holdings Ltd. (1993) 13 W.A.R. II (Ipp J.).
2. Biala Pty. Ltd. v. Mallina Holdings Ltd. (1993) 13 W.A.R. 11, affd sub nom. Dempster
v. Mallina Holdings Ltd. (1994) 13 W.A.R. 124.
3. Royal Commission into Commercial Activities of Government and Other Matters, No. 4
Special, W. AUSTL. Gov'T GAZETTE, Jan. 8, 1991, at 37-39.
4. Alan Bond, for one, and the then-Premier of Western Australia (and later Australian
Ambassador to Ireland and the Holy See), Brian Burke, for another.
5. Biala, 13 W.A.R. at 21.
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permitted those who were willing to invest in feasibility
investigations the exclusive rights to proceed with the projects if they
were demonstrated to be feasible.6 As explained by the court, "The
immediate object of the joint venture was to acquire the mandate and
to obtain and prepare a bankable feasibility. Subsequently, the object
was, if the venture reached that stage, to exploit the prospect to the
commercial advantage of the partners."7
Dempster and Mallina were not at arms length. Dempster held a
large number of shares in Mallina and was its chairman and
managing director.8 Although he departed from those roles prior to
the key events, it was clear that he was and remained the dominant
force in the joint venture, and controlled dealings both of Mallina
and his own holding company.9
The Minister for Minerals and Energy was approached, and he
agreed to recommend to the cabinet that the Dempster/Mallina joint
venture be given the mandate.1" The Minister proposed to do this by
employing a procedure known as "walking in.' This meant that the
proposal would not be put through all the normal public service
investigatory channels, thereby escaping the fullest scrutiny.
However, before the proposal for the mandate could be formally
dealt with, Mallina was the subject of some adverse publicity in the
media. 2 This was thought by the Premier of Western Australia to be
potentially embarrassing to the government, so he suggested to the
Minister that the proposal not be "walked into" cabinet after all but
rather put through normal departmental investigations. 3 This would
delay the venture.
Dempster, having been informed of the hiccup, met with the
Chief Executive Officer of Mallina. He falsely stated that the
government would not grant the mandate if Mallina remained part of
the joint venture.'4 The Chief Executive and Mallina's board of
6. Id.
7. Dempster, 13 W.A.Rat 171.
8. Biala, 13 W.A.R. at 21.
9. Id. at 23.
10. Id. at 20, 29.
11. Id. at 30.
12. Id. at 27, 30.
13. Id. at30.
14. Id. at30-31.
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directors were persuaded to exit the venture in return for $150,000,
which represented a sizeable profit over its expenses to date. Mallina
was aware that a replacement partner had been found by Dempster to
take up Mallina's interest. That replacement partner, Connell, did
come into the project, providing the $150,000 that went to Mallina.
Connell also paid a further $250,000 to Dempster's holding
company. Neither Connell nor Dempster disclosed this payment to
Mallina. 5
A new company, Petrochemical Industries Company Ltd.
("P.I.C.L.," and commonly pronounced as "pickle") was formed,
with the Dempster and Connell interests each holding 50 percent. 6
Connell injected substantial resources into the venture and utilised
his close connections to the state government. Eventually, P.I.C.L.
was awarded the exclusive mandate and produced the feasibility
study. 7
Some time after that, being some two years after Mallina had
been convinced to give up its half-share in the joint venture for
$150,000, P.I.C.L. was sold to a consortium comprising interests of
Alan Bond and a Western Australian government holdings
company. 8 The price paid was $400 million, of which the Connell
interests received $350 million and the Dempster interests received
$50 million. At the trial, Justice Ipp found that P.I.C.L. had a value
of only $100 million at the time.'9 Justice Ipp was of the view that
the reasons for the differential distribution of the $400 million to
ostensibly equal partners were shrouded in mystery: "No explanation
was proffered for the very strange difference in the consideration
received by the two equal shareholders,"2 and "the circumstances
relating to the discrepancy between the amounts received ... are on
the evidence quite inexplicable and ... bizarre .. 2
15. Id. at 31, 54.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 33.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 79.
20. Id. at 57.
21. Id. at 78.
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II. THE WRONGFUL CONDUCT
A. Common Law
Although the case did not proceed as one in tort, it is clear that
Dempster's conduct was fraudulent. He knowingly and dishonestly
made false statements that were intended to be relied upon and were
relied upon by Mallina to its detriment. Under the venerable
authority of Derry v. Peek,22 a liability for the tort of deceit
undoubtedly arose.
B. Equity
However, the relationship of the parties went beyond one
cognisable only at common law. Whether the joint venture between
Dempster and Mallina was one of partnership in the strict sense, it
was "plainly based upon mutual confidence and trust"23 and thereby
could be characterised as being of an equitable and fiduciary nature.
As such, it was expected that information gained, action taken, and
relationships developed would be used for the mutual benefit of the
joint venturers. As Justice Rowland subsequently put it in the
decision on appeal, "[w]ithin that relationship, there [was] little
scope for either party to seek to advance its own interests
individually in relation to the ultimate objective .... "24
More specifically, Justice Ipp found that each participant "owed
a duty of the utmost good faith to the other" and was obliged "to
display the utmost candour and honesty."25 Dempster was "bound to
state everything with strict and scrupulous accuracy."26 Dempster's
conduct and misrepresentations put him and his company in breach
of these fiduciary obligations. 7
22. (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
23. Biala, 13 W.A.R. at 57.
24. Biala Pty. Ltd. v. Mallina Holdings Ltd. (1993) 13 W.A.R. 11, affd sub noma. Dempster
v. Mallina Holdings Ltd. (1994) 13 W.A.R. 124, 171.
25. Biala, 13 W.A.R. at 58.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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III. THE REMEDY
A. Common Law
Considered from the common law vantage point of the tort of
deceit, Mallina's remedy would be in damages. By reason of
Dempster's fraudulent misrepresentation, Mallina exited from the
joint venture, that is, gave up its interest in it, receiving $150,000.28
However, since Connell was willing to, and did, part with
considerably more in order to obtain Mallina's half-share, the best
evidence of the value of that interest is the $400,000 paid by Connell.
A straightforward calculation of the difference tells us that the
measure of Mallina's damages in tort is $250,000.
B. Equity
Justice Ipp considered that Mallina's remedy should take the
form of "equitable compensation." In assessing such compensation,
Justice Ipp would "leave aside questions of causation (save that
compensation will only be awarded for losses caused by the breach
of fiduciary duties), foreseeability and remoteness, and ... apply the
full benefit of hindsight.
29
Doing so, Justice Ipp concluded that but for Dempster's
misrepresentations, Mallina would have remained in the joint
venture." By exiting, it lost the chance to make the kind of profits
Dempster made.
The starting point for calculating the compensation was the $50
million Dempster received. Although the purchasers paid out $400
million for P.I.C.L., the circumstances (as noted above) were
considered by Justice Ipp to be so "bizarre" that his Honour thought
that Dempster's share was worth no more than what it had received.3'
Some deductions were made for expenses that Mallina would have
had to pay, and the $50 million figure was reduced to some $38
million. Connell's advantages in terms of "wealth and his
connection with the government"3 2 and Mallina's own problems and
lack of political influence meant that a Dempster/Mallina joint
28. Id. at 31
29. Id. at 78.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 80.
EQ UITA BLE COMPENSATION
venture was less likely to have succeeded, and succeeded to the same
degree, as the Dempster/Connell venture. Justice Ipp discounted for
this contingency by a factor of 40 percent and awarded Mallina the
sum of $22,845,000 as equitable compensation for the loss suffered
by reason of Dempster's breach of fiduciary duties.33
C. Result
Ordinary damages at common law, whether for the tort of deceit,
negligence, breach of contract, or otherwise, are given for the
purpose of compensating the plaintiff for loss suffered.34 Equitable
compensation serves the same ostensible purpose.35 Despite that,
Biala appears to demonstrate how a $250,000 damages case becomes
converted to an equitable compensation case of almost $23 million.
As Wayne S. Martin has pointed out, "[i]n this case, therefore, the
distinction between damages assessed in accordance with
conventional common law principles for deceit and equitable
compensation was approximately $35 million!"36
IV. IMPACT
The decision in the Biala case demonstrates the potency of the
remedy of equitable compensation. At a more fundamental level, it
33. Biala Pty. Ltd. v. Mallina Holdings Ltd. (1993) 13 W.A.R. 11, affdsub nom. Dempster
v. Mallina Holdings Ltd. (1994) 13 W.A.R. 124, 173.
34. Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., (1880) 5 App. Cas. 25, 39 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Scot.) (U.K.).
35. See generally Michael Tilbury & Gary Davis, Equitable Compensation, in THE
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 797, 804-09 (Patrick Parkinson ed., 2nd ed. 2003) (explaining that
finding the distinction between the two is "difficult as a matter of principle," and that the terms
are "often, confusingly, used interchangeably").
36. The nominated figure allows for the sum of interest that was added to the award. See
Wayne S. Martin, Principles of Equitable Compensation, in CIVIL REMEDIES: ISSUES AND
DEVELOPMENTS 114, 137 (Robyn Carroll ed., 1996). Mr. Martin acted as counsel for the
Dempster parties, and is currently Chief Justice of Western Australia.
37. But see Jeff Berryman, Some Observations on the Application of Equitable
Compensation in WA.: Dempster v. Mallina Holdings Ltd., 25 W. AUSTL. L. REV. 317, 325-26
(1995) (arguing that damages in deceit would include the consequential loss of opportunity to
participate in what turned out to be a very profitable enterprise, and valued as such). Such an
approach, however, seems to give insufficient scope to a distinctive feature of equitable
compensation, namely that, unlike the common law, it attracts and utilises the full benefit of
hindsight. See G. M. & A. M. Pearce & Co. v. Austl. Tallow Producers, [2005] V.S.C.A. 113,
65; Martin, supra note 36, at 137 (arguing that if assessment is to be performed by reference to
circumstances at time of breach-which is the conventional approach of the common law-the
asset was very different in nature to the ultimate one that generated the huge profits; the chance of
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brings starkly home the continued significance within Australia of
the common law/equity divide or of the importance of equity as a
body of principle separate and distinct from the common law. The
success of the remedy, a success that has now clearly been confirmed
in the years following the Biala decision, leads us to consider
carefully several important matters.
V. EQUITY'S HOLD ON AUSTRALIAN LAW
Equity remains of supreme significance in Australian law. To
repeat the title of Andrew Burrows's article (but to ignore its critical
intent), "We Do This at Common Law but That in Equity"!38 Much
of the reason for this importance is found in the influence that the
State of New South Wales has on the national legal psyche in matters
of equity. Not only is it the most populous state with the heaviest
volume of litigation, but its connections with the traditions of equity
are unimpeachable.
Merger of the administration of common law and equity did not
take place in New South Wales until the period 1970-1972, close to
a full century following the passing of the equivalent Judicature Acts
in England.39 The legal profession and the judiciary are populated by
persons steeped in equity manners and traditions. While all may not
agree with the conventional view, the significance and authority of
that view is known, acknowledged, respected, and generally
followed. The Supreme Court of New South Wales still maintains
separate common law and equity divisions, one headed by a Chief
Judge at Common Law and the other by a Chief Judge in Equity.
The profession continues to use the parlance of an equity bar and
common law bar to distinguish barristers according to the
predominant or even exclusive nature of their practices. The
significance is manifested in the remark of New South Wales Chief
Justice Spigelman that one cannot overlook the "significance of the
achieving profits would have been reflected in the price paid, which would be the best guide to
the value of the lost opportunity at the time of breach, and therefore for deceit at common law).
38. Andrew Burrows, We Do This at Common Law but That in Equity, 22 O.J.L.S. 1 (2002).
39. This occurred in England with the passage of the Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c.
66 (Eng.). Most Australian colonies legislatively adopted the reform soon after. However, New
South Wales did not act until the passage of the Supreme Court Act 1970, as supplemented by the
Law Reform (Law and Equity) Act 1972. See RODERICK P. MEAGHER ET AL., MEAGHER,
GuMMOw & LEHANE'S EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES 45-47, 50-51 (4th ed. 2002).
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professional consensus of legal practitioners as a dimension of the
legal system distinguishable from formal sources of law ... .""
The High Court of Australia only reinforces the dichotomy.
From the maintenance of a limited, "plaintiff-friendly" notion of
causation when equitable compensation is claimed for breach of
equitable duty,4 to the rejection of any role for reduction of quantum
based upon comparative fault,42 to acceptance of the notion that a
plaintiff may be able to recover more if able to assert a cause in
equity than would be recoverable at common law on the same facts,43
it is plain, in the words of Justice Kirby of the Court: "in Australia,
the substantive rules of equity have retained their identity as part of a
separate and coherent body of principles .... .""
The Biala case fits well within that tradition. Indeed, its
characterisation in this Article as "underrated" stems from the view
that Justice Ipp's decision, in its potency, provided the practical
springboard to the resurgence of equitable compensation as a viable
remedy in Australian law.
VI. MODERN FLOWERING OF EQUITABLE COMPENSATION
The use of the word "resurgence" in the preceding section is
deliberate. A general compensatory remedy in equity is grounded in
the old Bill of Chancery to enforce compensation for breach of
fiduciary duty.45 Its modem birth is usually attributed to the "great
speech"46 of Lord Haldane L.C. in the 1914 House of Lords case
Nocton v. Lord Ashburton.47 Despite that, three nineteenth-century
40. Harris v. Digital Pulse Pty. Ltd. (2003) 56 N.S.W.L.R. 298, 306 (drawing from J. H.
BAKER, THE LAW'S Two BODIES: SOME EVIDENTIAL PROBLEMS IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
(2001)).
41. See Youyang Pty. Ltd. v. Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher (2003) 212 C.L.R. 484;
Maguire v. Makaronis (1997) 188 C.L.R. 449.
42. Pilmer v. Duke Group Ltd. (in liq.) (2001) 207 C.L.R. 165.
43. Id. at 225-26; McCann v. Switz. Ins. Austl. Ltd. (2000) 203 C.L.R. 579, 621-22.
44. See Pilmer, 207 C.L.R. at 231.
45. See Nocton v. Lord Ashburton, [1914] A.C. 932, 946 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)
(U.K.); see also Joshua Getzler, Equitable Compensation and the Regulation of Fiduciary
Relationships, in RESTITUTION AND EQUITY: VOLUME ONE, RESULTING TRUSTS AND
EQUITABLE COMPENSATION 235, 235-36 (Peter Birks & Francis Rose eds., 2000); PETER M.
MCDERMOTT, EQUITABLE DAMAGES ch. 1 (1994).
46. RODERICK P. MEAGHER ET AL., MEAGHER, GUMMOW & LEHANE'S EQUITY:
DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES 831 (4th ed. 2002).
47. [1914] A.C. 932 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
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Australian cases from the Supreme Court of Victoria actually
awarded the plaintiffs monetary remedies designed to restore them to
positions that existed prior to the breaches of fiduciary duty that
occurred in each of their situations.48
The significance of Nocton is that a court of high authority, the
House of Lords, freed equitable compensation from the bounds of
what Joshua Getzler has called its "core territory,"49 being the simple
personal duty of a trustee of an express trust to account for any
dissipated assets of the trust. Instead, the obligation to pay
compensation could be extended to a situation where no trust estate
was depleted but the beneficiary of a fiduciary duty was nevertheless
left worse off as a consequence of breach of fiduciary obligation. In
Nocton, a client had been advised by his solicitor to discharge
mortgage security." The solicitor had a conflict of interest that he
did not disclose, constituting fiduciary breach. The client was left
without adequate security when default occurred on the related loan.
The solicitor was held liable for the loss. As was explained, "[t]he
proper mode of giving relief might have been to order Mr. Nocton to
restore to the mortgage security what he had procured to be taken out
of it, in addition to making good the amount of interest lost by what
he did."'"
In the almost eighty years following the Nocton case, one can
find intermittent instances in Australia and elsewhere in the
Commonwealth of equitable relief keyed to compensating for losses
arising from breaches of fiduciary obligations. The best known of
these cases include McKenzie v. McDonald,52 Re Dawson (decd.),
Union Fidelity Trustee Co. v. Perpetual Trustee Co.," Hill v. Rose,54
Guerin v. The Queen,55 Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co.,56
and Day v. Mead." Martin provides a more extensive listing and
48. Robinson v. Abbott (1893) 20 V.L.R. 346, affd, (1893) 20 V.L.R. 371; Curwen v. Yan
Yean Land Co. (1891) 17 V.L.R. 64; Ballantyne v. Raphael (1889) 15 V.L.R. 538.
49. Getzler, supra note 45, at 236.
50. [1914] A.C. at 937.
51. Id. at958.
52. [1927] V.L.R. 134.
53. [1966] 2 N.S.W.R. 211.
54. [1990] V.R. 129.
55. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (Can.).
56. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534 (Can.).
57. [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 443 (C.A.).
280
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brief summaries of the cases that arose prior to (and to a slight
extent, following) Biala.8
However, in the fewer than fifteen years since Biala, there has
been a blossoming of cases from the superior courts. Just looking at
the Australian environment, for example, we see pursuit of the
remedy and judicial acceptance of its viability in a slew of cases,
spanning jurisdictions. Cases come from:
*the High Court of Australia, including: Maguire v.
Makaronis,59 McCann v. Switzerland Insurance Australia
Ltd. ,60 Pilmer v. Duke Group Ltd. (in liq.),6 Youyang Pty.
Ltd. v. Minter Ellison;62
ethe Federal Court of Australia, including: A.M.P. Services
Ltd. v. Manning (A.M.P. 1);63
*New South Wales, including: O'Halloran v. R. T. Thomas
& Family Pty. Ltd.,6  Beach Petroleum N.L. v. Kennedy,65
Digital Pulse Pty. Ltd. v. Harris;66
*Victoria, including: Murphy v. Lew,67 G.M. & A.M. Pearce
& Co. v. Australian Tallow Producers;68
.Queensland, including: Ferrari Investment (Townsville)
Pty. Ltd. (in liq.) v. Ferrari;69
*South Australia, including: Gemstone Corp. of Australia
Ltd. v. Grasso,7" Southern Real Estate Pty. Ltd. v.
Dellow; and
*Western Australia, including: Permanent Building Society
(In liq.) v. Wheeler.72
58. Martin, supra note 36, at 123-48.
59. (1997) 188 C.L.R. 449,468.
60. (2000) 203 C.L.R. 579, 621-22.
61. (2001) 207 C.L.R. 165, at 201-02 (McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan, JJ.), 224-
28 (Kirby, J. concurring on this point).
62. (2003) 212 C.L.R. 484, 497-99.
63. [2007] F.C.A. 82 (elaborating upon A.M.P. Services Ltd. v. Manning, [2006] F.C.A.
256).
64. (1998) 45 N.S.W.L.R. 262, 272, 274-78.
65. (1999) 48 N.S.W.L.R. 1, 90-94.
66. (2002) 166 F.L.R. 421, rev'd in part on other grounds, (2003) 56 N.S.W.L.R. 298.
67. (1994) 13 A.C.S.R. 10.
68. [2005] V.S.C.A. 113.
69. (2000) 2 Q.R. 359, 362.
70. (1994) 13 A.C.S.R. 695.
71. (2003) 87 S.A. St.R. 1.
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Equitable compensation following the Biala decision is now
established as a "vital part of [the] judicial armoury. ' 73 Yet it is still
"a developing area of the law;" its remedial vigor "of comparatively
recent vintage. ' 74 As such, it has offered scope for Australian law to
rethink the relationship between legal and equitable remedial relief,
and between law and equity itself. As put by Charles Rickett, the
burgeoning of the remedy invites us to think "about the make-up of
modem equity, and the latter's place in the civil law of obligations
and property in the new century."75 While this invitation has been
taken up elsewhere, it has largely been declined in Australia.
VII. No CONVERGENCE WITH COMMON LAW
If the invitation were to be pursued, it would be expected that
we would ask whether it is justifiable that the same conduct should
give rise to different results depending only upon whether one
classifies the wrongful conduct according to law, on the one hand, or
equity, on the other. There is no doubt, however, that Australian law
adopts a "very plaintiff-friendly" 76 attitude to the remedy. In the
context of equitable compensation, "the court is permitted to use
somewhat subjective 'tools' in arriving at a valuation; tools such as
common sense and general notions of justice and fairness."77 Justice
Somers put it similarly in a New Zealand case: "assessment will
reflect that which the justice of the case requires according to
considerations of conscience, fairness, and hardship and other
equitable features such as laches and acquiescence.""
Australian law is therefore comfortable with the notion that a
plaintiff may recover greater compensation in equity than might be
recoverable at common law on the same facts.79 Emphasis is placed
72. (1994) 11 W.A.R. 187.
73. Charles Rickett, Compensating for Loss in Equity--Choosing the Right Horse for Each
Course, in I RESTITUTION AND EQUITY: RESULTING TRUSTS AND EQUITABLE COMPENSATION
173, 173 (Peter Birks & Francis Rose eds., 2000).
74. Beach Petroleum N.L. v. Kennedy (1999) 48 N.S.W.L.R. 1, 90 (per curiam).
75. Charles Rickett, Equitable Compensation: Towards a Blueprint?, 25 SYDNEY L. REV.
31, 32 (2003).
76. Rickett, supra note 73,, at 176.
77. A.M.P. Services Ltd. v. Manning, [2006] F.C.A. 256, 69 (Finkelstein, J.).
78. Day v. Mead, [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 443,462 (C.A.).
79. Pilmer v. Duke Group Ltd. (in liq.) (2001) 207 C.L.R. 165, 225 (Kirby, J.); McCann v.
Switz. Ins. Austl. Ltd. (2000) 203 C.L.R. 579, 621-22 (Hayne, J.).
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on the distinctive "dual functions""°- compensatory and
prophylactic"8'-of equity. The Australian High Court's Justice
Kirby encapsulates the approach as follows: "[w]here fiduciary
obligations exist and have been breached, equitable remedies are
available both to uphold the principle of undivided loyalty which
equity demands of fiduciaries and to discourage others, human nature
being what it is, from falling into similar errors."82
The hold of history, that is, of the historical divide between law
and equity, is thus seen to be tenacious. Australian law is vigilant
regarding the maintenance of equity's "doctrinal integrity."83 While
it may well be that yesterday's equity is tomorrow's law, "[i]t is
quite another thing to declare that today's law will be tomorrow's
equity."84
Accordingly, Australian law, although challenged with the
argument that a modern and united legal system demands unity and
coherence and principle, remains adamant. The challenge is most
intense when the wrongful conduct of the defendant, as far as equity
is concerned, is mirrored in the law.
In the aftermath of Biala, an early example of that offered some
hope for a coherent development in Australian law. This is the case
of Permanent Building Society (in liq.) v. Wheeler." This is another
judgment of Justice Ipp, on this occasion in appellate proceedings
delivering the lead judgment of the Full Court of the Supreme Court
of Western Australia. The directors of the plaintiff company
("P.B.S.") caused it to enter into what turned out to be a questionable
land purchase transaction, questionable because of the personal
benefits that flowed to some of the directors.86 This transaction
produced a loss to P.B.S. Hamilton, P.B.S.'s Chief Executive
80. Pilmer, 207 C.L.R. at 227 (Kirby, J.).
81. Id. at 225 (Kirby, J.).
82. Id. at 224 (footnote omitted); see also Maguire v. Makaronis (1997) 188 C.L.R. 449, 465
(Brennan, C.J., Gaudron, McHugh & Gummow, JJ.) ("Equity intervenes ... to hold the fiduciary
to, and vindicate, the high duty owed .... ), 492 (Kirby, J., concurring) ("[Plurposes of
equity.., are somewhat different from those of the common law [including] ensuring the strict
loyalty and good faith to beneficiaries, the dutiful enforcement of obligations [and] the deterrence
of breaches by fiduciaries of their powers ....").
83. Hon. Mr. Justice R. P. Meagher & Adrian Maroya, Crypto-Fiduciary Duties, 26 U. NEW
S. WALES L.J. 348, 355 (2003).
84. Id. at 349.
85. (1994) 11 W.A.R. 187.
86. Id. at 192-94.
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Officer and Managing Director, was not implicated in the way of
personal benefits and, in fact, had claimed a conflict of interest and
had abstained from voting." Nevertheless, P.B.S. alleged that
Hamilton's duty to exercise care and skill on behalf of the company
had required him to oppose the purchase."
The court held that Hamilton had indeed acted in breach, not
quite in the way alleged, but in failing to give proper consideration to
the merits of the purchase.89 Viewed as a breach of duty of care at
common law, liability to pay damages to compensate for the
resultant loss would be limited, inter alia, by the principle of
causation. The court concluded that even if Hamilton had fulfilled
his duty, in all probability he would not have opposed the purchase
because, on the available evidence, the transaction looked sound.9"
However, Hamilton's duty as a director also arose in equity,
with its concern for the relationship between a company and its
directors. Although Hamilton occupied a fiduciary position in
relation to P.B.S., this particular duty was not one properly described
as a "true" fiduciary duty.91 Rather, it was a duty to exercise
reasonable care and skill, a "mere" equitable obligation: "[t]here is
every reason ... in such circumstances, to apply the maxim that
'equity follows the law."' 92 The court held that, but for the breach,
P.B.S. would still have suffered the loss that it did, and equitable
compensation was not awarded.93
Although the Wheeler case produced consistent outcomes at law
and in equity, ultimately it has not heralded a development in
Australian law that, at the intersection of law and equity, principles
should proceed in unison, without regard for historical binds.
Australian case law is replete with references to the more stringent
attitude of equity. The matter is approached with the full benefit of
hindsight.94 The court will not speculate against the interest of the
87. Id. at 235.
88. Id.
89. Id. at241.
90. Id. at 241-43.
91. See id. at 243.
92. Id. at 247-48.
93. Id. at 248-49.
94. Id. at 235; A.M.P. Servs. Ltd. v. Manning, [2006] F.C.A. 256, 66; S. Real Estate Pty.
Ltd. v. Dellow (2003) 87 S.A. St.R. 1, 14; O'Halloran v. R. T. Thomas & Family Pty. Ltd. (1998)
45 N.S.W.L.R. 262, 273.
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plaintiff.95 The plaintiff need only lead a minimum amount of
evidence to discharge the burden of causation.96
One may suggest that this discrepancy exists because Australian
courts have, with Wheeler as a rare exception, primarily been faced
with equitable compensation arising in the context of breaches of
trust or of true fiduciary duties. Here, it may be said that one is
striving to avoid "the courts being seen to wink at wrongdoing."97
But the general sentiment is much broader than that. It is established
in Australia that "the measure of compensation in respect of losses
sustained by reason of breach of duty by a trustee or other fiduciary
is determined by equitable principles and that these do not
necessarily reflect the rules for assessment of damages in tort or
contract."98
More directly on point is the tenor of the joint remarks of the
five-judge High Court of Australia bench that heard the case of
Youyang Pty. Ltd. v. Minter Ellison.99 There was the suggestion
derived from New Zealand law (and elsewhere' 0 ) that there just
might be a place in the coherent development of law generally for
reasoning by analogy where an equitable obligation mirrors a
common law obligation, namely:
[W]here the wrong amounts in substance to carelessness or
breach of contract, the policy considerations underpinning
the stricter approach are absent. Hence, whatever the
classification of the relationship, the law approaches the
questions of causation and remoteness on a different and
generally less onerous basis; namely whether there is a
sufficient causal nexus and also foreseeability or reasonable
contemplation of loss or damage of the kind in suit.''
There was this unanimous, virtually derisive, riposte:
95. Charles Lo Presti Pty. Ltd. v. Karabalios [2000] N.S.W.S.C. 395, 60; G.M. & A.M.
Pearce & Co. v. Austl. Tallow Producers, [2005] V.S.C.A. 113, 66.
96. Charles Lo Presti, [2000] N.S.W.S.C. 395 at 66.
97. Maguire v. Makaronis (1997) 188 C.L.R. 449, 493 (Kirby, J).
98. Pilmer v. Duke Group Ltd. (in liq.) (2001) 207 C.L.R. 165, 201 (McHugh, Gummow,
Hayne and Callinan, JJ.).
99. (2003) 212 C.L.R. 484.
100. E.g., Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534 (Can.) (LaForest,
J.).
101. Bank of N.Z. v. N.Z. Guardian Trust Co., [1999] 1 N.Z.L.R. 664, 688 (C.A.) (Tipping,
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[T]here must be a real question whether the unique
foundation and goals of equity, which has the institution of
the trust at its heart, warrant any assimilation even in this
limited way with the measure of compensatory damages in
tort and contract. It may be thought strange to decide that
the precept that trustees are to be kept by courts of equity
up to their duty has an application limited to the observance
by trustees of some only of their duties to beneficiaries in
dealing with trust funds. 1
0 2
VIII. EQUITABLE COMPENSATION AND
EXEMPLARY (OR PUNITIVE) DAMAGES
A similar resolute anchoring to the historical touchstone of
equity's distinctiveness from the common law can be seen in the case
of Harris v. Digital Pulse Pty. Ltd."°3 The defendants Harris and
Eden were employees of the plaintiff Digital Pulse, a small
information technology company."' Harris was an experienced
marketer, and Eden an experienced web designer."5  Their
employment contracts contained non-competition clauses. More
significantly for present purposes, the defendants were in
responsible-enough positions in Digital Pulse as to be subject to the
usual fiduciary duties. Contrary to both the common law contractual
and equitable fiduciary obligations to which they were subject, they
set up their own business and diverted projects from Digital Pulse to
themselves. 6 In relation to the breach of fiduciary duties, Justice
Palmer at trial awarded equitable compensation in relation to Digital
Pulse's losses or, at Digital Pulse's election, an account of profits.0 7
Justice Palmer then turned his attention to Digital Pulse's claim
for exemplary damages. He catalogued seven factors about the
defendants' conduct:
,First, their conduct was calculated to make a profit and also
to cause harm to an employer that was particularly
vulnerable.
102. Youyang, 212 C.L.R. at 500.
103. (2003) 56 N.S.W.L.R. 298.
104. Id. at 313.
105. Id.
106. Digital Pulse Pty. Ltd. v. Harris (2002) 166 F.L.R. 421, 422.
107. Id. at 449.
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eSecond, their conduct was consciously dishonest.
oThird, the diversion of business to their own company did
not just happen, it was carefully planned.
oFourth, the defendants were clearly delighted at the success
of their ability to divert business from Digital Pulse to
themselves.
oFifth, it was almost certain that there were other diversions
of business that were still concealed.
oSixth, the breaches of fiduciary obligation were aided and
furthered by other wrongdoing on the part of the
defendant amounting to the misappropriation of
confidential information.
*Seventh, much of the defendants' conduct in their own
interests took place on Digital Pulse's time from Digital
Pulse's premises using Digital Pulse's facilities. 108
To use the time-honored Anglo-Australian terminology, Justice
Palmer was satisfied that all of this, taken together, demonstrated on
the part of the defendants, "conscious wrongdoing in contumelious
disregard of another's rights,"1"9 deserving of condemnation and
punishment. Justice Palmer ordered Harris and Eden each to pay
$10,000 in exemplary damages.110
This decision to award exemplary damages was overturned by
the majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal
("N.S.W.C.A."). 11 However, the N.S.W.C.A. did not differ from
Justice Palmer on the merits of the plaintiffs claim for exemplary
damages in the sense of analysis of the defendants' conduct. Nor did
the Court query the quantum or the internal legal principles that
courts apply in deciding whether to award exemplary damages. To
the contrary, Justice Heydon quite directly stated that Justice
Palmer's reasoning was "entirely correct provided ... he was correct
in his view ... which is at the heart of the controversy between the
parties to [the] appeal."
' 12
108. Id. at 437-39.
109. Whitfeld v. De Lauret & Co. (1920) 29 C.L.R. 71, 77; Gray v. Motor Accident Comm'n
(1998) 196 C.L.R. 1, 7.
110. Digital Pulse, 166 F.L.R. at 442, 449.
111. Harris v. Digital Pulse Pty. Ltd. (2003) 56 N.S.W.L.R. 298.
112. Id. at 346.
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So what was the "heart of the controversy?" For the
N.S.W.C.A., the court was faced with a foundational jurisdictional,
or judicial power,"3 matter. The obligation breached had been a
fiduciary obligation, cognisable not at common law but only in
equity. Exemplary damages are a remedy from the common law side
of the divide. Before fusion of the administration of law and equity,
a court of equity had no power to award exemplary damages."4
Could there now, however, be anything in the nature of cross-over of
remedies? Justice Palmer had examined the authorities and reached
the view that it was open to him to award exemplary damages for
breach of a fiduciary obligation." 5 The majority of the Court of
Appeal, over the dissent of its President, slapped him down." 6
Justice Heydon (then the junior justice on the panel but
delivering his last judgment there prior to his elevation to the High
Court of Australia) was forthright. There was "no power in the law
of New South Wales to award exemplary damages for equitable
wrongs.""' There was no precedent for such a power in the case law
nor in statute. Fusion of the administration of law and equity did not
involve fusion of their principles. It was improper to analogise from
the common law or to allow the common law to influence equity's
development. It was not an objective of equitable relief to punish:
"equity and penalty are strangers.""' 8
Although allowing himself some "wiggle room" for the future'
and being content in point of law to limit himself to the decision that
a court exercising the jurisdiction of equity has no power to make a
"punitive monetary award" (as he called it) with respect to a
fiduciary relationship created by contract between the parties,'
20
Chief Justice Spigelman stated that he generally agreed with Justice
Heydon's reasons and accepted his analysis of the authorities.'
2'
113. Id. at 321 (Mason, P.).
114. Digital Pulse, 166 F.L.R. at 446, 449.
115. Id. at 448.
116. Harris, 56 N.S.W.L.R. at 312.
117. Id. at 422.
118. Aquaculture Corp. v. N.Z. Green Mussel Co., [1990] 3 N.Z.L.R. 299, 302 (C.A.)
(Somers, J., dissenting).
119. Harris, 56 N.S.W.L.R. at 304 ("Remedial flexibility is a characteristic of equity
jurisprudence.").
120. Id. at 303.
121. Id.
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Further, and significantly, the Chief Justice expressed the strong
view that it is correct to "acknowledge and respect the collective
wisdom of our predecessors who, with respect to disputes of a kind
that have occurred many times, have never felt the need to be able to
award a monetary sum for the purpose of punishment, deterrence,
denunciation or vindication."''
The fundamental position of the Chief Justice is found in this
passage:
The integrity of equity as a body of law is not well served
by adopting a common law remedy developed over time in
a different remedial context on a different conceptual
foundation. The fact that exemplary damages are awarded
in tort is, in my opinion, not a basis for asking "Why not?"
in equity.'23
The fact that there are powerfully put alternative positions ' is,
for present purposes, not to the point. There is an immutable
foundation to Justice Heydon's approach (and the Chief Justice's as
well, if perhaps marginally less so). It is the same foundation that we
saw above: "we do this at common law but that in equity.'
25
CONCLUSION
It has been several pages since we dealt with the remedies case
that is supposedly at the center of this Article, namely Biala Pty. Ltd.
v. Mallina Holdings Ltd.'26 That, one surmises, is the inevitable fate
of an "underrated" case. One hopes, however, that the point of
raising this case has not been lost. One shies well away from
claiming a direct cause and effect relationship; indeed, the case
would hardly be "underrated" if there were one. Yet it is a fair
supposition that the facts and result in Biala drew sharp attention to
the capacity of equity, via its somewhat dormant general
compensatory remedy, to achieve tangible financial results for
122. Id. at 307.
123. Id. at 306.
124. See, e.g., Michael Tilbury, Fallacy or Furphy?: Fusion in a Judicature World, 26 U.
NEW S. WALES L.J. 357, 376 (2003) (arguing that the question is not about fusion or non-fusion
approaches as such, but rather about the principled development and application of doctrine
through analogical reasoning); Harris, 56 N.S.W.L.R. 298, 416 (Mason, P., dissenting).
125. Burrows, supra note 38.
126. (1993) 13 W.A.R. 11.
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plaintiffs that otherwise might have been thought to be beyond them.
Coupled with the "energetic development of the reach of equitable
duties,"'27 that is, an extension of equity into the ordinary commercial
sphere, 12 the remedy blasted off.
For Australian remedies academics, this is thoroughly evident
through a comparison of editions of the primary casebook in the
subject. The first edition of Michael Tilbury, Michael Noone, and
Bruce Kercher's Remedies: Commentary and Materials, published in
1988, contains an excerpt from just one case 129 (plus seven short
supplementary notes) in the fewer than five pages devoted to the
section "Compensation in Equity.""'3 In contrast, the current edition
covers over thirty-seven pages' (an increase of over 800 percent)
and extracts seven cases, supplemented by twenty notes and
questions, and additional textual commentary.
During the course of this journey, Australian law has had to face
the challenge of breaking away from historical chains or at least
justify itself by appeal to reason and principle, rather than history.
This Australian law has failed to do. Australia is a jurisdiction
where, like it or not, for better or for worse, conventional doctrinal
categories matter and matter a great deal. For example, it is a
jurisdiction where, prior to recent legislative amendment,
contributing fault on the part of a plaintiff could result in damages
being apportioned and reduced for breach of a duty of care in tort but
not if the plaintiff was able to ground the claim for breach of a
corresponding duty of care arising in contract.'32
In the law of remedies, and elsewhere, legal developments (apart
from those generated by statute) will be made within the bounds of
conventional doctrine and legal reasoning. Perhaps that is not such a
bad thing in the context of a participatory democracy like Australia
where voting in federal and state elections is compulsory (and failure
to comply subject to criminal sanction), but the sort of great societal
127. Rickett, supra note 75, at 31.
128. See generally P.D. FINN, EQUITY AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS (1987).
129. Re Dawson (decd.), Union Fidelity Trustee Co. v. Perpetual Trustee Co. [1966] 2
N.S.W.R. 211.
130. See MICHAEL TILBURY, MICHAEL NOONE & BRUCE KERCHER, REMEDIES:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 288-92 (1988).
131. MICHAEL TILBURY, MICHAEL NOONE & BRUCE KERCHER, REMEDIES: COMMENTARY
AND MATERIALS 403-40 (4th ed. 2004).
132. Astley v. Austrust Ltd. (1999) 197 C.L.R. 1, 15.
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changes wrought by decisions such as the second Brown v. Board of
Education case'33 are unlikely ever to emerge from within such a
legal and judicial environment.
133. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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